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BOOK REVIEW
Bribery, Crusades & Reforms by W. Michael Reisman. New York: Free Press/McMillan. Biblio. Index. 1979. Pp. x
277. $12.95 hardcover.
FOLDED LIES:

Rodolphe J. A. de Seife*
After having laboriously plowed through Professor Reisman's
tedious prose, one comes away with a feeling of depression over the
author's apparent philosophy of life. After having spent two summers with a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), one would think that Professor Reisman, a lawyer,
would produce something more than what is essentially an uncritical inquiry into the seamier side of human behavior, i.e., the hypocritical gap between law and its enforcement filled by rules of behavior to which only a few are privy. All of us will agree that the
law is a part of the social sciences but, as lawyers, we would prefer
not only to have more reference to actual cases with an explanation
of why they do or do not resolve the all-pervasive problem of bribery, but also to be given a clue as to the possible solutions for
bribery.
This somewhat pedantic treatise is not one that a layman will
find easy to read. The style is often labyrinthic and written in a
manner, alas, familiar to all too many lawyers.
According to Professor Reisman, bribery is part of the human
system. He adopts a broad definition of bribery which includes
every light deviation from the established enforcement norm and
encompasses what we would call judgmental or sound discretionary
decisions.
Bribery, seen in the light of this analysis, is part of an "operational code" used by the "doers in the real world." The "doers"
have fabricated the myth system, of which our laws are but a part,
to keep the rest of us satisfied with the status quo, the real
"opium" of the people. This state of affairs may be unfortunate
and its acknowledgment by the author cynical, but it is probably a
substantially correct assessment of "what is." This does not resolve
how we go about dealing with the problem of bribery, if it is a
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problem.
The answer to selective enforcement of the law, in my opinion,
does not reside in acknowledging and accepting the fact that bribery and discriminatory enforcement of the law will be with us forever as it has always been. Essentially, all Reisman does is verify
that "a photograph of four legs beneath the curtain of a voting
booth" is Chicago's logo, as one local writer put it.' Whether bribery is legal or illegal, right or wrong, Folded Lies does not really
tell us: all we get out of this reading is that it will be forever-more!
I, for one, view with a jaundiced eye the definition of law as
part of the myth system. Again, Professor Reisman may be correct.
He is, one may assume, a sophisticated and learned individual
teaching law at Yale. Yet he is apparently more attuned to the research methodology of the general social sciences than to the scholarship of the law.
The theme of Reisman's research is not all that complicated.
Reisman is saying that laws are created which some of us, the "operators", cannot or will not abide by, thus resulting in the need for
an "operational code" which only the "in" people know about.
This permits them to operate around the so-called myth system of
which law is a part. Thus, the operators preach about free market
and unfair advantage but do not really believe in these things, because the only way the system can work is if there is some kind of
incentive for them, in the form of bribery, which permits the
wheels of government to turn more efficiently.
There are, according to Reisman, three main forms of bribery:
first, those that "speed up processes" which he calls transactional
bribes, and which apparently are quite common and relatively
harmless; second, those which keep certain things from happening
and are called "variance bribes." This second type of bribe is in
somewhat of a twilight zone. Third, the bribe by which one actually purchases an individual's loyalty for a particular length of
time so that his services will not be rendered to the public or to
the government, but rather to the briber. These are the so-called
"outright purchases."
The book further states that the law, as part of the "myth system", might make some forms of bribery illegal, but that these
laws have, in fact, very little bite in them: no reality, just myth.
These laws encourage, of course, selective enforcement. One reads
nothing in this book about that particular social disease, if it is
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one. Rather, Reisman goes on to state that when the public outrage
reaches the level of quasi-revolutionary mood, the manipulators in
the establishment create "crusades" to satisfy the reform mood of
the people, but these crusades are strictly designed for the benefit
of the members of the establishment. These crusades are not true
anti-bribery "reforms"; they do not change the operational code,
but they satisfy the people's hunger for adherence to the myth system. Reform proposals are so designed as to give with one hand
and take away with the other, being engineered ab initio to be ineffectual. "Reform" may yet occur when the public outrage verges
on, or possibly culminates in, revolution. All this accomplishes is a
change in the operational code as it now stands for the benefit of
the members of the new establishment. As the French put it, "Plus
va change, plus c'est la m6me chose." In any event, with the whole
machinery of power on the side of the operators' establishment,
there is apparently not much that can be done except to wait for a
total decay of the present social system from within. The result is
its replacement by a new system that will be just as corrupt because this is the way humans do business.
I do not know whether or not to bemoan the fact that a law
professor spends the taxpayers' money to support what is in essence a cynical verification of what people already "know" to be a
fact. Some of us innocents thought, up to now, that law was meant
to be enforced and that antiquated laws should be wiped off the
books. We also thought that laws which cannot be enforced should
not be enacted. To call the law part of the "myth system", without
qualification, is shocking, and the author's cynicism, which becomes apparent through a careful reading of the book, gives the
reader an empty feeling. There is very little "law" in this treatise,
just an exposition of a rather shallow, if not simplistic, social science theory of what the law is all about. To that extent, Reisman's
book should interest those of us who have an interest in jurisprudence since this appears to be a good example of the product of
the self-styled "realist" school of thought. In terms of what the law
is all about, or should be about, and what law professors should
teach their students in a system which is already cynical enough,
this book fails to make any constructive contribution.
At the other extreme we find William Safire's missionary philosophy, which may be equally simplistic: namely, that bribery is
incompatible with democracy and honest competition (United
States style), and that "American" ways and ideas should travel
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arm-in-arm with American trade and power.2 When all is said and
done in such a contest of conflicting views, were I forced to choose,
I would rather opt for the "bleeding hearts" as a better harbinger
for the future of our civilization.
As lawyers, we cannot afford to become cynics. We should remain idealists, albeit "realistic idealists." It is our duty to make
every effort to narrow the gap between Myth Systems and Operational Codes, not to set the defects of the system in stone.
A totally sterile and nonjudgmental inquiry into bribery, such
as the one undertaken by Professor Reisman, falls short of meaningful scholarship. I believe that the author owes us the more important part of such a study: suggestions or indications as to how
we are to narrow the schism between the law and its enforcement.
That, I submit, is the real issue involved herein. The lawyer's creative role as a social engineer begins where that of the social scientist, as an observer of the human scene, ends.

2. New York Times, August 14, 1975 at 7, col. 1.

